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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

IN RE: 23ANDME, INC. CUSTOMER
DATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION

Case No.: 3:24-md-03098-EMC

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO
INTERVENE; MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT**

Judge: Hon. Edward M. Chen
Courtroom: 5, 17th Floor
Hearing Date: October 17, 2024
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO INTERVENE

To the Clerk of Court and all interested parties:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 17, 2024, at 1:30 p.m., or on such other date or time as this matter may be heard, in the courtroom of the Honorable Judge Edward M. Chen, located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 17th Floor, Courtroom 5, San Francisco, California 94102, Intervenor Vivian Gonczi, Howard Packer, and Lance Alligood (collectively, "Intervenor")

1 will and hereby do, move for an order allowing intervention under Federal Rule of Civil
2 Procedure Rule 24(a) as a matter of right or, in the alternative, under Rule 24(b) for permissive
3 intervention, for the purpose of opposing the proposed class settlement before the Court.

4 This Motion is made on the grounds that the proposed class action settlement in this
5 matter is intentionally designed to undermine the rights of claimants actively pursuing individual
6 arbitrations against 23andMe pursuant to a contract, specifically 23andMe's own Terms of
7 Service, which require individual arbitration as the exclusive means by which to resolve any and
8 all disputes with the company. The proposed Intervenorors are among approximately 4,966
9 claimants who are represented by the undersigned counsel and who previously provided notices
10 to 23andMe of their respective individual claims and have initiated their individual arbitrations
11 against the company regarding the compromise of their genetic data via the 23andMe data breach
12 at issue before this Court (collectively, "Claimants"). These Claimants have ongoing arbitration
13 proceedings based on specific damages arising from the exposure of their highly sensitive genetic
14 information by 23andMe. The class settlement, as currently proposed, requests extraordinary and
15 unprecedented relief in the form of an injunction of thousands of pending arbitrations, which
16 would effectively extinguish Intervenorors and Claimants' private contractual rights to pursue
17 arbitration while also offering inadequate compensation for the distinct and long-lasting harms
18 they have suffered and will continue to suffer because of 23andMe's data breach. The Motion
19 will be heard on this Notice of Motion and Memorandum in Support below, as well as other
20 filings and arguments that may be submitted and the Proposed Order filed herewith.
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1 Dated: September 26, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

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INTRODUCTION

This Motion to Intervene is filed on behalf of Intervenor Vivian Gonczi, Howard Packer, and Lance Alligood, who are among approximately 5,000 Claimants represented by the undersigned counsel and who are currently engaged in arbitration proceedings against 23andMe pending before JAMS. Intervenor and similarly situated Claimants were directly affected by the April 2023 data breach caused by 23andMe's inadequate data security policies and practices, which allowed unidentified third parties to download and sell extraordinarily sensitive personally identifiable information about their genomics, DNA profiles, ancestries and ethnicities on the Dark Web. The data of nearly one million 23andMe users with alleged Jewish ancestry, including their home addresses, was sold by cyber criminals on hacking platforms.¹ The exposure of this data, is particularly dangerous given the current volatile political climate, including the war in the Middle East.²

Intervenor assert that the proposed class action settlement seeks extraordinary and unprecedented relief. It seeks to strip away contractual rights between private parties to the benefit of 23andMe and detriment of the Claimants and Class Members. At the time they signed up for 23andMe's services, 23andMe forced these Claimants and Class Members to surrender their rights to sue in court over any and all disputes and controversies and instead required them

¹ Oldfield, Ariella, *23andMe faces lawsuit as hackers sell information on users with Jewish heritage*, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL, Jan. 31, 2024, available at <https://www.timesofisrael.com/23andme-faces-lawsuit-as-hackers-sell-information-on-users-with-jewish-heritage/> (last accessed Sept. 25, 2024).

² Antisemitic incidents increased by 36% in the United States in 2022 with more than 3,500 incidents, many of which were assaults targeting Jewish people. Sganga, Nicole, *Highest number of antisemitic incidents since 1979 recorded last year, Anti-Defamation League finds*, CBS NEWS, Mar. 23, 2023, available at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/antisemitic-incidents-most-since-1979-anti-defamation-league-annual-report/> (last accessed Sept. 25, 2024).

1 to pursue their claims through private arbitration proceedings. When 23andMe instituted this
2 adhesive contract and arbitration requirement, it hoped it would be immune from lawsuits and
3 liability, fully believing no consumer would ever waste their time or money to actually go through
4 the arbitration process. 23andMe was wrong. In the wake of the data breach, thousands of
5 Claimants sought to enforce their rights through 23andMe's own arbitration process. Faced with
6 the reality that 23andMe's own arbitration process no longer benefitted 23andMe, 23andMe now
7 seeks to avoid the very dispute resolution process it created. Essentially, 23andMe seeks to play
8 a game of "heads I win, tails you lose." In other words, if 23andMe thought it could avoid
9 liability through the arbitration process, there is no doubt 23andMe would seek to invoke that
10 arbitration clause to kill a lawsuit. But now that the arbitration clause no longer serves to benefit
11 23andMe, it has completely disavowed that clause and rushed to reach a class wide settlement to
12 impair the contractual rights of Claimants and Class Members. The proposed settlement before
13 the Court threatens to enjoin class members, including Intervenors and Claimants, from pursuing
14 ongoing private arbitrations unless and until they affirmatively opt out within a narrow timeframe
15 set by the settlement. There is no basis to enjoin these ongoing arbitrations. Moreover, the opt-
16 out provisions, as outlined in paragraphs 73(h) and 80-88 of the Settlement Agreement, unfairly
17 burden Claimants by requiring strict compliance with a convoluted opt-out process clearly geared
18 towards making it difficult for Claimants and Class Members to opt out and pursue individual
19 arbitration. Moreover, the proposed class settlement fails to provide adequate safeguards against
20 the risks posed by exposure of the arbitration claimants' genetic data, such as the incorporation
21 of logging and monitoring programs and requiring annual SOC 2 Type 2 assessments specifically

1 sought by the arbitration claimants to ensure long-term protection and independent oversight of
2 23andMe's data security practices.

3 This Motion is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) for intervention as a
4 matter of right, as Intervenors and Claimants have a protectable interest that will be impaired if
5 the proposed class settlement is approved without their participation. Alternatively, Intervenors
6 seek permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), as their claims share common legal and factual
7 questions with the class action yet focus on the improperly requested injunction of their
8 individual arbitrations through which they seek specific relief necessary to address the unique
9 harm caused by the genetic data breach. Pursuant to this Motion, Intervenors seek leave to file
10 the Opposition to Proposed Injunction and Opt-Out Procedures Sought by Plaintiffs' Motion for
11 Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
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14 **STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS**

15 **A. Status of the Class Action Litigation**

16 In October 2023, 23andMe publicly disclosed that a significant data breach occurred,
17 compromising millions of users' personal and genetic data. Following this announcement,
18 over forty (40) class action lawsuits were filed, all alleging that 23andMe failed to adequately
19 protect user data and violated various consumer protection laws. These lawsuits were
20 consolidated into a Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) in the Northern District of California,
21 overseen by the Honorable Edward M. Chen. On September 12, 2024, the MDL parties reached
22 a proposed settlement which includes a \$30 million fund to compensate affected users. While the
23 proposed settlement provides for general monetary compensation and credit monitoring services,
24 it requests extraordinary and unprecedented relief by asking this Court to strip away contractual
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rights between private parties by way of an injunction of thousands of pending private arbitrations. Specifically, ¶ 73.h) of the proposed settlement agreement requests:

“preliminary injunction of all Settlement Class Members and their representatives from filing, commencing, prosecuting, maintaining, intervening in, conducting, continuing, or participating in any other lawsuit or administrative, regulatory, arbitration or other proceeding based on the Released Claims, unless and until they personally submit a timely request for individual exclusion pursuant to the Settlement Agreement after receiving Notice.”

Plaintiff’s Proposed Settlement, ECF No. 103-2, ¶ 73(h). Further, the proposed settlement lacks relief specifically addressing the long-term consequences associated with the exposure of genetic data, a central issue for Intervenor and Claimants. Notably, the request for a preliminary injunction has drawn the attention of the Court, prompting the Honorable Judge Chen to question whether “either party discussed this requested preliminary injunction with the attorneys representing the plaintiffs in the state court cases or the claimants in the arbitration proceedings?” Order Re Supp. Briefing and/or Evidence, ECF No. 111, ¶ P. The answer on behalf of counsel for the Intervenor and Claimants with pending arbitrations is a definitive “no.”

B. Status of the Mass Arbitration Proceedings

Beginning in December 2023, the undersigned counsel sent 23andMe notices of dispute on behalf of thousands of Claimants regarding its April 2023 data breach. And in February 2024, one hundred (100) Claimants filed individual demands for arbitration of their claims with JAMS in accord with 23andMe’s governing Terms of Service. Claimants and 23andMe paid their respective filing fees to JAMS and confirmed their readiness to proceed. JAMS is currently in the process of assigning arbitrators to preside over these individual matters. The next step will be for those arbitrators to schedule preliminary hearings and enter scheduling orders. Notices of

1 dispute were sent to 23andMe on behalf of thousands of additional Claimants throughout April
2 and May 2024. In July 2024, an additional 4,866 Claimants submitted individual demands for
3 arbitration of their claims to JAMS where they remain pending.

4 Intervenor and Claimants' claims seek relief for 23andMe's negligence in safeguarding
5 their highly sensitive personal and genetic data, and the long-term risks occasioned by the breach,
6 including potential misuse of genetic information and future discrimination. Significantly, the
7 specific relief requested by Intervenor and Claimants in their demands surpass the general
8 remedies included in the proposed class action settlement. As a general matter, Claimants stand
9 to recover far more through private arbitration than simply participating as absent class members
10 in this Settlement. Moreover, they also seek non-monetary relief not covered by the settlement,
11 including, for example, logging and monitoring programs, ongoing independent oversight
12 through annual SOC 2 Type 2 assessments, and stricter data security protocols to ensure
13 continuous protection of genetic data. These particular remedies are crucial to adequately address
14 the unique harm caused by exposure of the arbitration claimants' genetic information.
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17 **C. The Settlement and the Burdensome Opt-Out Process**

18 The proposed class settlement improperly includes a preliminary injunction provision
19 which, if approved, would enjoin *all* class members—including Intervenor and Claimants who
20 are currently pursuing arbitration—from filing, commencing, or participating in any arbitration
21 or related proceedings unless they submit a timely request for exclusion. This injunction would
22 effectively bar Intervenor and Claimants from continuing to pursue their claims in arbitration
23 unless and until they go through the onerous opt-out procedure proposed under the class
24 settlement. Plaintiff's Proposed Settlement, ECF No. 103-2, ¶ 73(h). The proposed opt-out
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procedures unreasonably require any class members wanting to opt out of the class to submit a written request that must:

- Include the case name of the Litigation: In Re: 23andMe, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, Case No. 24-md-03098-EMC;
- Identify the name and current email and mailing addresses of the Person seeking exclusion from the Settlement;
- Identify the 23andMe username or email associated with the 23andMe account for the Person seeking exclusion from the Settlement;
- Be individually signed by the Person seeking exclusion using wet-ink signature, DocuSign, or other similar process for transmitting authenticated digital signatures;
- Include an attestation clearly indicating the Person's intent (to be determined by the Notice and Claims Administrator) to be excluded from the Settlement;
- Attest that the Person seeking exclusion had a 23andMe user account as of August 11, 2023.

Plaintiff's Proposed Settlement, ECF No. 103-2, ¶ 81. Even opt-out requests submitted electronically via the claims portal require jumping through an additional hoop by verifying the request within three business days of the Opt-Out Deadline, which is clearly intended to void otherwise valid opt-out requests. *Id.* at ¶ 82.

Significantly, the proposed opt-out procedures do not allow for the undersigned counsel to opt their own clients (i.e., Intervenor and Claimants) out of the class en masse or otherwise, despite the fact that Intervenor and Claimants are represented by counsel and, as 23andMe has full knowledge, have expressed their intent to continue their individual arbitrations. Indeed, the

1 settlement agreement expressly states that any such requests seeking exclusion on behalf of more
 2 than one individual shall be deemed invalid. *Id.* at ¶ 83.

3 Additionally, the proposed class settlement offers only non-descript remedies such as
 4 “credit monitoring” in addition to the proposed limited monetary compensation. These non-
 5 specific remedies fail to address distinct, long-term risks posed by 23andMe’s exposure of
 6 Intervenor and Claimants’ genetic data. Intervenor and Claimants are understandably
 7 concerned that these generalized remedies are insufficient to protect them from future harm,
 8 given that genetic information, once exposed, cannot be changed or retracted. Thus, the class
 9 settlement’s failure to account for these unique risks requires preservation of the arbitration
 10 claimants’ ability to pursue the specifically tailored relief sought in the ongoing arbitration
 11 proceedings.
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14 **ARGUMENT**

15 **A. The Proposed Intervenor Satisfy the Requirements of Rule 24(a) and Should Be** 16 **Allowed to Intervene as a Matter of Right.**

17 A court must allow intervention to anyone who “claims an interest relating to the property
 18 or transaction that is the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action may
 19 as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing
 20 parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). In order to intervene as a matter
 21 of right, a prospective intervenor must show: (1) the motion is timely, (2) the applicant has a
 22 significantly protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
 23 action, (3) the disposition of the action may impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect
 24 that interest, and (4) the existing parties do not adequately represent the applicant’s interest.
 25 *United States v. Oregon*, 839 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1988). Courts interpret the requirements for
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1 intervention broadly, favoring intervention where possible. *Prete v. Bradbury*, 438 F.3d 949, 954
2 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 **1. The Application to Intervene Is Timely**

4 Timeliness is the “threshold requirement” for a party seeking to intervene under Rule
5 24(a). *United States v. Oregon*, 913 F.2d 576, 588 (9th Cir. 1990). Three factors determine
6 whether a motion is timely: “(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to
7 intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of the delay.”
8 *County of Orange v. Air California*, 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, the proposed
9 settlement has only now reached the stage where the MDL parties have agreed on terms, and the
10 plaintiffs having moved this Court for conditional certification of the settlement class and
11 preliminary approval. ECF No. 103-1. The Motion to Intervene, therefore, is at this point timely
12 and appropriate. Courts routinely find intervention in response to a proposed settlement to be
13 timely when intervenors act promptly upon learning a proposed settlement may adversely affect
14 their interests. *E.g., Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.*, No. 06-4068, 2007 WL 474936, at *3 (N.D.
15 Cal. Jan. 17, 2007), *aff’d*, 331 F. App’x 452 (9th Cir. 2009). Timeliness is generally measured
16 from the point when the proposed intervenor receives notice the settlement terms may be contrary
17 to their interests, not from the beginning of the litigation. *Id.*

18 In this case, Intervenors moved to intervene shortly after learning the proposed settlement
19 does not adequately protect their rights. The settlement negotiations were conducted
20 confidentially and without the inclusion of the undersigned counsel, and the terms were only
21 made public via the filing of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
22 Settlement on September 12, 2024. The motion to intervene was filed promptly on September
23 26, 2024, only fourteen days after the settlement became public, well within the time frame
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1 allowed for intervention (with no undue delay) and prior to any related hearings or issuance of
2 notice to the putative class. It is important to remember the “*most important circumstance* relating
3 to timeliness is that the [proposed intervenors] sought to intervene as soon as it became clear that
4 [their] interests would no longer be protected by the parties in this case.” *Cameron v. EMW*
5 *Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C.*, 595 U.S. 267, 279-80, 142 S. Ct. 1002, 212 L.Ed.2d 114 (2022)
6 (cleaned up and emphasis added). That “most important” consideration strongly weighs in favor
7 of intervention here.
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9 The second factor asks whether intervention will prejudice the existing parties. Prejudice
10 occurs when intervention would expose a negotiated settlement to contrary authority, delay the
11 relief being sought, or compromise settlements reached after extensive negotiations. *Glass*, 2007
12 WL 474936, at *4-5; *Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods*, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1978). *Day v.*
13 *Apoliona*, 505 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2007) (although the State of Hawaii could have sought
14 intervention at any time during two years of proceedings, its motion did not cause prejudice to
15 plaintiffs). However, when potential intervenors act as soon as they have notice that a proposed
16 settlement may be contrary to their interests, as Intervenors did here, courts generally find no
17 prejudice. *Carpenter v. County of Elko*, 298 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he interveners
18 acted promptly after they had notice that the government may not have adequately represented
19 their interests in negotiating the settlement[.]”); *Day*, 505 F.3d at 965 (“A would-be intervenor’s
20 delay in joining the proceedings is excusable when the intervenor does not know or have reason
21 to know that his interests might be adversely affected by the outcome of litigation.”).
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25 Here, there is no prejudice to the existing parties because the Intervenors acted as soon as
26 they had notice to promptly protect their rights. Conversely, the proposed settlement—if
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1 approved without intervention—threatens to extinguish Intervenor and Claimants’ ability to
2 continue pursuing their arbitrations or to secure specific relief for the unique injuries arising from
3 the exposure of their sensitive genetic data. The MDL plaintiffs, through this settlement, purport
4 to resolve claims on behalf of *all* affected users. ECF No. 103-1, p. 8. But the proposed class
5 settlement places an undue burden on the Intervenor and Claimants, effectively barring them
6 from pursuing their individual arbitrations as required under 23andMe’s Terms of Service and
7 further seeks to prevent them from seeking more tailored relief from the long-term consequences
8 of 23andMe’s breach.

9
10 Intervention will not delay or disrupt the current settlement proceedings. Intervenor do
11 not seek to derail the MDL settlement for those who wish to participate in it. Rather, they seek
12 to ensure their interests in arbitration and more comprehensive relief are fully represented and
13 protected if their claims are encompassed by the proposed settlement. Therefore, allowing
14 intervention will not unduly prejudice the existing parties or cause significant delays.

15
16 The third factor—the reason for and length of any delay—also indicates in favor of
17 timeliness. As discussed above, this motion was filed shortly after the settlement terms were
18 made public on September 12, 2024. The Intervenor acted promptly upon realizing the proposed
19 settlement threatened their rights, filing this motion within two weeks of learning about the class
20 settlement and its terms. Significantly, at no time did counsel for 23andMe attempt to
21 communicate with the undersigned counsel regarding the existence of the putative class
22 settlement or its potential impact on Intervenor and Claimants’ pending arbitrations. In fact, the
23 evidence suggests 23andMe’s counsel aimed to hide their class settlement negotiations and thrust
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1 the settlement upon Claimants without notice. There was no undue delay in bringing this Motion
 2 and the Intervenor has moved as swiftly as possible to protect their interests.

3 Courts acknowledge that, when settlement negotiations have been conducted
 4 confidentially, potential intervenors lack notice that their interests are unprotected until the
 5 settlement terms are disclosed. *E.g., Carpenter*, 298 F.3d at 1125 (“[T]he mediation proceedings
 6 had been conducted under an order of confidentiality and the settlement negotiations were not
 7 conducted in open court. By entering into confidential settlement discussions, the government
 8 does not give notice that it may not be adequately representing the interests of any group of
 9 citizens.”). Here, the Intervenor was not privy to the settlement negotiations and only became
 10 aware of the settlement terms when the motion for preliminary approval was filed. The
 11 Intervenor has therefore moved to intervene at the earliest possible moment.
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14 In sum, this Motion is timely under the standards established by the Ninth Circuit. The
 15 proposed Intervenor acted promptly after becoming aware of the proposed class settlement, and
 16 their intervention will not prejudice the existing parties or disrupt the settlement process.
 17 Therefore, the timeliness requirement for intervention is satisfied.
 18

19 **2. The Proposed Intervenor Has the Requisite Interest in the Subject** 20 **Matter of This Case**

21 The Intervenor has a significant and legally protectable interest in the subject matter of
 22 this case. Under Rule 24(a)(2), intervention must be allowed upon demonstration of an interest
 23 in the underlying litigation that is “significantly protectable” and directly affected by the outcome
 24 of the case. A party has a sufficient interest for intervention purposes if it will suffer a practical
 25 impairment of its interests as a result of the pending litigation. *California ex rel. Lockyer v.*
 26 *United States*, 450 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2006).
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1 “An applicant has a ‘significant protectable interest’ in an action if (1) it asserts an interest
2 that is protected under some law, and (2) there is a ‘relationship’ between its legally protected
3 interest and the plaintiff’s claims.” *California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States*, 450 F.3d 436, 441
4 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, the arbitration claimant’s rights are directly protected under privacy and
5 contract laws, as they seek specific relief for the exposure of their sensitive genetic data. These
6 claimants have a direct and substantial interest in ensuring that the proposed class settlement does
7 not extinguish their ability to pursue the specific remedies they are entitled to under arbitration.
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9 Here, Intervenor and Claimants have a direct and substantial interest in ensuring the
10 proposed class settlement does not extinguish their ability to pursue their pending individual
11 arbitrations before JAMS or to seek the specific relief discussed above through arbitration. If the
12 class settlement is approved in its current form, Paragraph 73(h) will prevent *all* class members—
13 including Intervenor and Claimants—from filing or continuing arbitration proceedings unless
14 they individually comply with a cumbersome opt out procedure within a narrow timeframe. This
15 provision directly threatens Intervenor and Claimants’ ongoing claims and right to pursue
16 arbitration, undermining their efforts to seek specific relief for the long-term risks caused by the
17 exposure of their legally protected genetic data.
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20 Courts consistently determine Rule 24(a)(2) should be broadly construed in favor of
21 intervention. *United States v. City of Los Angeles*, 288 F.3d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 2002). To intervene
22 as of right, the proposed intervenors must show they have a protectable interest that may be
23 impaired by the litigation. In *Smith v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist.*, the court recognized that
24 denying intervention could impair the ability of a sub-class to safeguard their interest, particularly
25 where their rights were threatened by the policies and agreements formed within the class action
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1 framework. *Smith v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist.*, 830 F.3d 843, 863 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding
 2 that denying intervention would impair a subclass' ability to protect its interest, particularly
 3 where the class action framework threatened the rights of the subclass to challenge district-wide
 4 policies)). Similarly, here, the proposed settlement's injunction threatens the arbitration
 5 claimants' ability to obtain tailored relief for the exposure of their genetic data through arbitration
 6 and hinders their ability to ensure long-term protection and independent oversight of 23andMe's
 7 data security practices.
 8

9 The proposed class settlement seeks to enjoin ongoing arbitration proceedings, which
 10 directly conflicts with Intervenor's efforts to secure tailored relief through arbitration. Here, the
 11 Intervenor identifies a unique, protectable interest in pursuing arbitration which will be impaired
 12 if the proposed class settlement is approved in their absence. By enjoining all arbitration, the
 13 settlement risks leaving Intervenor and Claimants without the opportunity to proceed with their
 14 respective arbitrations or obtain the specific relief they seek. This substantial impairment justifies
 15 intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24.
 16

17 **3. Disposition of the Case Will, as a Practical Matter, Substantially Impair** 18 **or Impede Proposed Intervenor's Interests.**

19 A proposed intervenor's interests are impaired "[i]f an absentee would be substantially
 20 affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action." *Southwest Ctr. for*
 21 *Biological Diversity v. Berg*, 268 F.3d 810, 822 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing advisory committee's
 22 notes). The proposed class settlement substantially affects the Intervenor's interests because it
 23 threatens to extinguish their private contractual rights, including the ability to pursue their
 24 pending arbitrations and more comprehensive and tailored relief sought through arbitration,
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1 leaving them barred from proceeding and with only inadequate generalized remedies that fail to
2 redress the unique harms they suffered.

3 Intervenor and Claimants have already initiated arbitration proceedings against
4 23andMe, seeking specific relief for the exposure of their sensitive genetic data. Significant time
5 and money has been spent preparing, filing, and pursuing their demands in arbitration. Claimants
6 stand to recover far more monetarily through private arbitration than by participating as absent
7 class members in the proposed settlement before the Court. Moreover, the non-monetary relief
8 sought includes detailed protocols necessary to prevent future breaches and to ensure that
9 23andMe adheres to enhanced security standards. For example, the arbitration demands the
10 implementation of logging and monitoring programs, which are essential for real-time oversight
11 of data security and detection of potential future breaches. Furthermore, the arbitration calls for
12 a third-party assessor to conduct SOC 2 Type 2 assessments on an annual basis to independently
13 evaluate 23andMe's compliance with the terms of any award. This ongoing, independent
14 oversight is crucial considering the extraordinarily sensitive nature of the exposed genetic data
15 yet is entirely absent from the proposed class settlement relief.

16 The relief offered in the proposed class settlement is far less comprehensive. Plaintiff's
17 Proposed Settlement, ECF No. 103-2, ¶¶ 70-72. Even though it includes measures such as multi-
18 factor authentication, unspecified annual audits, and password protection, these measures (while
19 positive) are insufficient to address the *long-term* risks associated with the exposure of *genetic*
20 data. The settlement lacks the rigorous third-party monitoring and independent audits sought by
21 the arbitration claimants. For instance, the internal audits in the settlement do not have the depth
22 and independence of the SOC 2 Type 2 assessments, which the arbitration claimants believe are
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1 critical for ensuring 23andMe maintains robust data protection protocols over time. Additionally,
2 while the settlement provides for a policy regarding the retention of personal information for
3 inactive or deactivated accounts, Settlement Agreement, ¶ 70(g), it does not address the
4 Intervenor and Claimants' specific concern for the necessity of ongoing third-party validation
5 of data deletion and secure handling of genetic information. This omission leaves Intervenor
6 and Claimants without assurance that their sensitive genetic data will be adequately safeguarded
7 in the future.
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9 If the proposed class settlement is approved in its current form, it would have far reaching
10 implications. Essentially, Parties could strip away private contractual rights when they no longer
11 suit them under the guise of the All Writs Act by way of an injunction that prevents class
12 members, including Intervenor and Claimants, from pursuing their ongoing arbitration
13 proceedings unless and until they jump through various hoops such as the onerous opt-out
14 procedures set forth in the Settlement Agreement. Settlement Agreement, Paragraph, ¶ 73(h).
15 This provision directly threatens Intervenor and Claimants' ability to obtain the specific relief
16 they seek, forcing them to choose between forfeiting their arbitration claims or accepting
17 generalized relief that does not fully address their injuries.
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20 The opt-out process is not straightforward and imposes unnecessary burdens on class
21 members, particularly the nearly 5,400 arbitration claimants. It requires claimants to submit a
22 variety of detailed personal information—including current and past email addresses, 23andMe
23 account details, and a signed attestation—all within a narrow timeframe. These stringent
24 requirements, combined with the demand for a personal signature, create significant obstacles,
25 making it difficult for claimants to opt out.
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1 This process seems tailored to suppress the impact and voice of the arbitration claimants
2 by making it impractical for many to meet the complex and time-sensitive requirements. The
3 sheer number of claimants involved in ongoing arbitration underscores the importance of
4 individualized relief, yet the burdensome opt-out process increases the likelihood that many will
5 inadvertently lose their right to pursue arbitration. Instead, they may be forced to accept a
6 generalized settlement that does not address their specific injuries or the long-term risks
7 associated with the exposure of their sensitive genetic data.
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9 In sum, the proposed class settlement seeks to completely bar Intervenor's pending
10 arbitrations and simultaneously fails to offer comprehensive and specific relief necessary to
11 address the unique and long-lasting harm they experienced. The potential loss of their right to
12 pursue arbitration, along with the opportunity to obtain meaningful, tailored relief that directly
13 addresses the exposure of their sensitive genetic data, constitutes a significant impairment of their
14 protectable interests. As such, the approval of the class settlement, without intervention, may
15 substantially impair or impede the Intervenor's ability to safeguard their rights. This
16 unquestionable risk to their interests makes intervention necessary under Rule 24(a)(2).
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19 **4. Proposed Intervenor's Are Inadequately Represented by Existing Parties**

20 To determine whether representation is adequate, courts consider: (1) whether a party
21 before the court will make the same arguments the prospective intervenor would; (2) whether the
22 present party is capable and willing to make those same arguments; and (3) whether the
23 intervenor would offer necessary elements to the proceedings that other parties would neglect.
24 *California v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency*, 792 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the
25 burden is on the proposed intervenors to show that representation is inadequate, this burden is
26 minimal and may be satisfied by a showing that representation of their interests by parties
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1 presently before the court “may be” inadequate. *Arakaki v. Cayetano*, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th
2 Cir.2003). The Intervenor focus on preserving their right to continue their respective arbitration
3 proceedings and to seek specific types of relief through arbitration, as opposed to accepting the
4 broad, generalized relief offered by the class settlement. The Intervenor and Claimants already
5 initiated arbitration proceedings to address the specific harms resulting from the exposure of their
6 genetic information and submitted their arbitration demands to JAMS months before the class
7 settlement was presented to the Court. Their primary interest lies in ensuring they have an
8 unimpaired opportunity to continue pursuing their arbitrations and seek relief specifically tailored
9 to their unique circumstances. In contrast, the MDL class representatives are primarily concerned
10 with securing broad relief for all class members, the majority of whom have not exercised their
11 rights to arbitrate their claim. The settlement offers only generalized remedies like financial
12 compensation and credit monitoring, failing to address the specific and long-term harm caused
13 by the exposure of genetic information. These broad MDL remedies do not account for the
14 distinct and potentially lifelong risks faced by those whose sensitive genetic data was
15 compromised. The Intervenor’s interests are unlikely to be fully represented by the class
16 representatives, who (as demonstrated by the terms of the proposed MDL settlement) failed to
17 recognize and provide for these unique concerns. Moreover, the proposed settlement extinguishes
18 for all class members, including the Intervenor, all rights to seek or to continue arbitration unless
19 they strictly comply with an opt-out process that is clearly designed to discourage participation
20 and prevent opting out. By requiring detailed personal information, multiple account details, and
21 personal signature within a narrow timeframe, the process imposes unnecessary hurdles. These
22 complex requirements make it difficult for claimants to opt out, effectively steering them into a
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1 generalized settlement that fails to address their specific claims. This provision directly conflicts
2 with the Intervenor's interests, as they seek to continue their arbitrations in pursuit of more
3 comprehensive relief. The tension between the relief sought by the MDL class representatives
4 and the Intervenor demonstrates why the Intervenor's interests are not adequately represented
5 by the existing MDL parties.

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7 The class settlement, by contrast, forces claimants into a one-size-fits-all resolution that
8 fails to account for the unique risks posed by the exposure of the specific type of potentially
9 dangerous genetic information made available to the criminal elements of the Dark Web. The
10 Intervenor's distinct interests in obtaining different relief through arbitration cannot be
11 adequately represented by the MDL class, justifying intervention under Rule 24(a)(2).

12
13 **B. Alternatively, Proposed Intervenor Should Be Entitled to Permissive Intervention**

14 Even if the Court finds that intervention as of right is not warranted, the proposed
15 Intervenor should be granted permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). Permissive intervention
16 is appropriate when the applicant's claim shares a common question of law or fact with the main
17 action and will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights. *Id.*
18 Here, both the class members and Intervenor seek relief for 23andMe's failure to protect
19 sensitive personal and genetic information, making the legal and factual issues common. Courts
20 regularly allow permissive intervention when the intervenor provides a unique perspective not
21 fully represented by existing parties. *Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.*, 552 F.2d 1326,
22 1329 (9th Cir. 1977). The Intervenor's concerns regarding the continued pursuit of individual
23 arbitrations and the long-term risks of genetic data exposure, including potential misuse and
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1 discrimination, offer a valuable perspective that complements the class action and may not
2 otherwise be presented to the Court.

3 Permissive intervention will not cause undue delay or prejudice. The Intervenor seek
4 only to protect their right to pursue individualized relief through arbitration, without derailing
5 the settlement for other class members. Their intervention ensures their distinct interests are
6 safeguarded, particularly against a settlement that does not address their specific prayers for
7 relief.
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9 Permissive intervention should be granted as the Intervenor provide necessary elements
10 to the proceedings without impeding the overall settlement.

11 **CONCLUSION**

12 The Intervenor have a protectable interest in the subject matter of this case and meet the
13 four elements for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a): the motion is timely, they have a
14 direct interest in the case, that interest would be impaired if intervention is denied, and the
15 existing parties do not adequately represent their interests.
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17 For these reasons, the Court should grant the Intervenor's motion to intervene and grant
18 them leave to file the Opposition to Proposed Injunction and Opt-Out Procedures Sought by
19 Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, attached hereto as
20 Exhibit A. A Proposed Order granting this Motion is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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1 Dated: September 26, 2024.

Respectfully submitted,

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